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AbstrAct
Managing budgetary crisis is often seen as a process involving the extensive balanc-
ing between different, often competing interests and groups. Hungary’s post-2010 
history, however, presents the relatively clear case of a government – almost uncon-
strained politically and apparently free from the pressures to seek compromises – 
facing the challenge of re-balancing its budget. We examine whether and how for-
mal and informal mechanisms of political control change under such conditions. The 
findings established shed light on the nature of politicization trends. It seems that 
informal institutions of political control compete with, rather than supplement, weak 
or dysfunctional formal institutions, thereby counteracting the latter.
Keywords: Debt management; Politicization; Informal institutions; Central and 
Eastern Europe
1. Introduction
Research on political control and politicization in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
is mainly derived from one or both of two viewpoints. They focus on the formal 
institutional arrangements of political control and the dysfunctions of those formal 
arrangements (such as clientelism, politicization, corruption, nepotism), and/or on 
civil servants’/politicians’ views, values and (role) perceptions regarding the subject 
matter. While these approaches are indispensable to understanding how and why 
political control functions, they are often limited in their ability to systematically 
study the presumably highly developed and dense patterns and dynamics of infor-
mal political control over government apparatuses. This seems to be a particularly 
important as well as a challenging task in the CEE context, where formal institutions 
are often seen as generally weak (Nunberg 1999) or even as “empty shells” (Falkner 
and Treib 2008). 
Strengthening political control by any means necessary is a permanent fixture on 
political executives’ agendas. However, this ambition is limited by a variety of fac-
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tors such as formal institutions of checks and balances, powerful political players and 
organized societal/economic interests. Hungary’s post-2010 period offers a special 
opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of general formal and informal political 
control strategies and how and why their workings change. This period is character-
ized by two rare and coincidental contingencies. The first is the continuation and 
deepening of the fiscal and economic crisis, which began in 2008 and led to a severe 
need for emergency management, thereby intensifying politicians’ quest for political 
control. Combined with the first, the second contingency – namely, the emergence of 
a political superpower as a result of the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2010, 
when the center-right coalition (FIDESZ-KNDP1) acquired a more than two-thirds 
majority of parliamentary seats – is particularly important. The emergence of this 
superpower meant that most of the checks and balances counteracting the maximiza-
tion of political control became obsolete, or at least much weaker than before. It is 
this historical coincidence of a sudden increase in the pursuance of political control, 
on the one hand, and the removal of many of the factors restricting that struggle, on 
the other, that makes the post-2010 period particularly apt for study with regard to 
the dynamics of informal political control.
The broad ambition of this study is to examine the way in which institutions of 
political control – including both formal and informal ones – changed in the years 
following the 2010 turning point in Hungary’s post-transition political history. We do 
so, in the final analysis, in order to acquire a deeper understanding of our central 
subject of interest: informal institutions of political control, their nature and the way 
they function. In pursuance of this ambition, in the remainder of this section, we 
describe the context. In particular, we give an overview of (i) the prehistory of 
(mostly failed) attempts at shaping/strengthening political control, (ii) the concomi-
tant broad-scope institutional and constitutional changes having taken place in the 
years following 2010, and (iii) the prehistory and evolvement of the fiscal and eco-
nomic crisis surrounding those changes. Section 2 contextualizes the study theoreti-
cally and conceptualizes the most important notions used. Section 3 explicates the 
research questions and describes the data and the method used. Section 4 summa-
rizes the findings related to the first research question on formal mechanisms of 
political control while Section 5, focusing on the second research question, describes 
the changes having happened to informal institutions of control. The study ends with 
a brief concluding section.
2. Background information
2.1 Dynamics of the political landscape in Hungary: A brief prehistory of the 
post-2010 era
Hungary has been a unitary, parliamentary republic since 1990, when the Commu-
nist regime came to an end. Hungary’s state structure – as it existed from 1990 to 
2010 – can be assessed as a relatively unique one, characterized by a very robust 
system of institutional checks and balances. This was created as a result of political 
1  FIDESZ: Alliance of Young Democrats, KDNP: Christian-Democratic People’s Party
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deals struck around the time of the system change with the purpose of blocking 
future attempts at reversing the liberal democratic transition. This system was 
essential to guarantee the successful transition into democracy. As an unintended 
side effect, the dense structure of checks and balances resulted in serious gover-
nance dysfunction in the longer run, and it is sometimes referred to as regulatory 
impotence (Hajnal 2010, Korkut 2012, Sárközy 2012).
After the 1994 elections, the majority-winner, the post-communist party 
(MSZP2) – in the hope to gain more legitimization and increase power at the same 
time – established a coalition with the liberal party (SZDSZ3), so the new governing 
power gained control over 2/3 of the parliamentary seats. In spite of the opportunity 
to modify the constitutional framework as a result of this supermajority, the coalition 
decided not to act without the consensus of the then opposition parties. In the 
absence of such a consensus, the basic institutional framework remained untouched.
The FIDESZ-led coalition governing since the 1998 elections suffered in a vein 
similar to its predecessors from having narrow elbow-room among the many clauses 
of the constitution, which truly hindered the governments enacting large-scale chang-
es in the current setting of economy or society. Despite economic progress (i.e., 
growth of GDP that exceeded the EU-average and the significant reduction of state-
debt), as well as the upcoming EU accession, FIDESZ failed to gain the mandate for 
an additional 4-year period of governance at the 2002 elections. Presumably, this 
outcome can be traced back – as the election-winning, left-wing opposition stated in 
its campaign – to the ruling party’s “antidemocratic behavior”, well symbolized by its 
conflicts with the Constitutional Court. This stigma was strong enough to compel 
FIDESZ to operate for eight years (two election cycles) in opposition. This was 
enough time to invent an ideology to support their intentions and manner of practicing 
power, which are embodied in the widely disseminated vision of the “strong state”.
By the second half of the 2000s – in comparison with the international main-
stream conceptualizations that are somewhat specific and idiosyncratic – FIDESZ 
openly and emphatically committed itself to a concept of a “strong” and “neo-Webe-
rian” state characterized by – among others – an unquestioned authority, moral 
supremacy, and practical control of the state over each and every societal actor – 
most of all, the market (G. Fodor and Stumpf 2007, 2008; G. Fodor 2012; for a 
critical reflection, see Hajnal and Pál 2013).
In the meantime, the governing center-left coalition faced, once again, the severe 
constraints limiting policy-making and political control. As a response, it attempted, 
from 2006 onwards, within the very tight political and legal framework available, to 
formally centralize power as well as strengthen informal mechanisms of political 
control. This – mostly failed – ambition is well represented by acts like abolishing 
the position of permanent state secretaries in ministries, regional reform aimed at re-
centralizing middle-tier governance (finally blocked by the Constitutional Court, 
Hajnal and Kovács 2013) or sweeping changes in the public-administration staff, 
where even head-of-department positions were filled with those loyal to the new 
political leaders. The insupportable political and fiscal situation led to the coalition’s 
2  MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party
3  SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats
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breakdown and a minority government with a new prime-minister (Bajnai), who tried 
to govern by substituting missing political power with the build-up of technocratic 
institutions (such as independent agencies) supreme in their political decision-mak-
ing to balance its weakness. The steadily declining prestige and the lack of success 
in managing both the budget and the economy led to a significant fall in the popular-
ity of the previously governing, left-wing parties, sweeping away all obstacles along 
FIDESZ’s path to gain a 2/3 majority in the parliament at the 2010 elections. 
2.2 The fundamental re-shaping of institutions (2010-2013)
After the inauguration of the new Cabinet, with Prime Minister Orbán as leader, a 
unique situation emerged that allowed the wholesale reformulation of the Hungarian 
politico-administrative landscape. At the heart of this spectacular change was a 
quest to further enhance political control over administrative apparatuses, in addi-
tion to broader sectors of the economy and society. It is the latter aspect – the re-
shaping of political institutions at large – which received significant attention in 
international politics and in media, as well as (although to a much lesser extent) in 
scholarly work (e.g. Bánkuti et al. 2012, Korkut 2012). The former, much more 
“technical” aspect of seizing increasing, barely limited control over administrative 
apparatuses remained an area largely unexplored by systemic research. Hence, we 
will devote a separate research question to this issue and return to it in Section 4.
The well-thought-out series of steps resulting in a fundamental reshaping of 
political institutions involved, among others, the following elements:
 • limiting, in several steps (including amendments to the Constitution), the 
Constitutional Court’s scope of authority and filling it with prominent 
FIDESZ loyalists;
 • the creation/basic reshaping of vital independent agencies such as the 
Electoral Commission, the Media Authority, the Competition Authority and 
the Central Bank and filling them with FIDESZ loyalists enjoying extended 
mandates (up to 9 or even 12 years); 
 • nominating a prominent FIDESZ loyalist (former party vice president) as 
President of the Republic;
 • the adoption – notably without any consultation with either the parliamen-
tary opposition or broader societal groups – of an entirely new constitution;
 • a systematic weakening of a series of institutional checks and balances such 
as ombudsmen, the State Audit Office and the Budgetary Council by either 
eliminating them (partially or completely), limiting their scope of authority 
or replacing their leaders with prominent FIDESZ loyalists.
This incomplete and patchwork-like list suggests that the present government’s 
ambition of seizing more control covers the broadest realm of political/state institu-
tions. This is a key feature of the context in which the re-shaping of instruments 
controlling government bureaucracy – our key focus of interest – took place.
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2.3 Deepening fiscal crisis 
The fiscal and economic crisis, which started in 2008, posed a serious challenge to 
Hungary’s public budget, which was already heavily burdened by a high level of 
public debt and deficit. In order to understand the political and economic situation 
of the austerity management during the post-2010 period, we present a short over-
view of the prehistory of the crisis. 
Hungary’s transition from a communist regime to a democratic republic occurred 
simultaneously with the transition from an indebted and ineffective state-socialist 
economy to a market one. This led to an intense recession in the economy and a 
deepening crisis in the state budget. As a result of the comprehensive post-transition 
stabilization package in 1995, Hungary’s economy progressed toward a stable and 
sustainable growth path, characterized by a GDP growth exceeding 3% and declining 
public debt (having decreased to a remarkable level of 52.7% in 2001). This hopeful 
trend burgeoned after 2002, when – in the campaign of the parliamentary elections 
– the competing parties engaged in a mutual and cumulative spiral of significant fis-
cal pledges, which was seen by many observers as unfeasible and dangerous. These 
worries seem to have been well founded. Only the two weightiest elements of the 
“pledge package” – the increase of pensions (13th-month benefits) and the 50% raise 
in salaries throughout most of the public sector – alone caused an additional deficit 
amounting to 1.8% of the GDP. Additional tax reductions led to another 1.5% 
increase of the deficit. As a result of these uncovered measures, public debt increased 
directly and permanently to a significant extent, from 52.7% of GDP in 2001 to 
55.9% in 2002. It reached 65.9% by 2006, coupled with a deficit of the current bal-
ance amounting to 9.4% of GDP.4 The fiscal expansion systematically exceeded the 
otherwise promising GDP growth rate, thus making the course of events unsustain-
able. Nevertheless, the same governing coalition was re-elected in 2006. The old-
new governing coalition – with an extremely thin majority in the parliament – was 
not able to constrain the growth of debt that reached 67% of GDP in 2007, the last 
pre-crisis year. Thus, market-based financing of the sovereign debt seemed impos-
sible already in the first months of the crisis. An IMF/EU credit of 20 billion Euros 
had to be opened and partially drawn upon. Subsequently, the debt rate reached the 
record proportion of 81.8% in 2010. 
An important plank in the election campaign for the election-winning FIDESZ 
party was the containment of fiscal expansion and a reduction of public debt. (Of 
course, these were key points in the EU/IMF agenda, too, coupled with the excessive 
deficit procedure of the European Commission. In a sense, the Cabinet had no room 
for maneuver in this regard.) The Orbán administration entering office in May 2010 
found itself in a situation requiring profound and immediate structural changes in the 
public household.
4  Source: EUROSTAT (Government statistics, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal /gov-
ernment_finance_statistics/data/database)
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3. Conceptual framework of the study
As the above overview suggests, the broader context in which these changing patterns 
are examined is not a “normal” one, but is rather characterized by an acute crisis situ-
ation. This is important, since crisis and political control are far from being unrelated. 
Existing research seems to support the expectation that crisis situations tend to height-
en the quest for political control. Peters (2011) examines the proposition that crisis has 
a tendency to strengthen centralization and the political character of decision-making. 
On the basis of previous experience and theoretical argumentation, he concludes that, 
with some exceptions to the rule, other considerations become secondary: “For the 
same reasons that decisions become more centralized in these [crisis] situations, there 
is a tendency for decisions that might have been more technical or managed through 
bureaucratic means to become more political” (Peters 2011, 78; for broadly similar 
conclusions, see Kickert 2012, Peters et al. 2011, and Raudla et al. 2013). 
In the following subsections, we conceptualize our central dependent variable, 
informal political control of administrative apparatuses, by first scrutinizing the con-
cept of politicization as an all-encompassing term covering the numerous and diverse 
forms of non-formalized political control and subsequently drawing a line of concep-
tual demarcation between formal and informal institutions.
3.1 Politicization and political control 
Politicization of government apparatuses is often conceptualized simply as “the 
substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, 
promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service” (Peters and 
Pierre 2004, 2; see also Flinders 2008). There are numerous attempts to embrace the 
many additional ways in which government apparatuses and policies can be influ-
enced by informal values (societal, political or organizational), interests and aspira-
tions (e.g. Eichbaum and Shaw 2008, Peters 2001). 
In his research of regulatory agencies in four of the largest European countries, 
Thatcher (2002) concludes that there are important channels of exerting direct, insti-
tutionalized, formal political control over agencies at politicians’ disposal. These 
include the nomination and early dismissal of senior staff, allocating the resources 
– especially budgets – of subordinate organizations, and the power to overturn deci-
sions of these organizations. Interestingly, his empirical analysis concludes that 
politicians – with some minor exceptions – do not use these formal powers. 
According to Thatcher, this finding raises the question whether elected officials con-
trol agencies through “means such as creating resource dependencies and/or informal 
relationships” (Thatcher 2002, 962).
What are these informal channels of influence? Peters (2001, 244 ff.) goes into sub-
stantial detail enumerating and delineating politicians’ tools – formal and informal – or, 
as he puts it, “ploys” of politically controlling bureaucratic apparatuses such as creating 
special (e.g. budgetary) institutions and controlling the staff by means of politicization. 
While some of these so-called ploys may be located in the realm of quasi-formal 
institutions, others are more informal. Unfortunately – at least from our current point 
of view – Peters does not go into detail regarding this distinction. In order to concep-
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tualize this from our critically important research problem at hand, we have to look 
for some additional building blocks. 
3.2 Informal and formal institutions of political control
In their impressive contribution, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) offer a starting point 
useful for our current purposes. They conceptualize informal institutions as “social-
ly shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced 
outside of officially sanctioned channels” (ibid., 727). The Table 1 presents a typol-
ogy of the various sub-types of informal institutions. 
Table 1: A typology of informal institutions
Source: Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 728
The vertical dimension of the Table 1 indicates whether the informal institution in 
question strengthens or weakens the purported outcome of the respective formal 
institutions – that is, whether its outcome points to a similar or to a different/opposite 
direction. The horizontal dimension indicates whether the corresponding formal 
institutions function or not. The upper-left cell (complementary institution) corre-
sponds to the functional while the lower-right cell (competing institution) to the 
dysfunctional type of informal institution. The former may be exemplified by 
bureaucratic norms guiding behavior in cases not sufficiently regulated by formal 
rules; while the latter can be illustrated by, for example, political clientelism super-
seding formal channels of administrative accountability. Of the remaining portions 
of the table, the upper-right cell of substitutive institutions is, from our current per-
spective, of particular importance. This may be illustrated by a professional ethos 
ensuring effective collaboration in a public organization (e.g. an emergency service) 
where formal lines of accountability do not work sufficiently well.
Turning specifically to how the above issues appear in the CEE region, one may 
notice some important differences. Besides the general observation that after the EU 
accession, politicization increased and merit-system arrangements weakened, two 
key differences should be noted here (Beblavy and Beblava 2012, Meyer-Sahling 
and Veen 2012, Kopecky and Spirova 2011; for a critical comparative analysis of 
these approaches, see Gajduschek 20125). 
First, a key function of political appointments is to ensure control by the political 
masters in a world of weak/non-functioning control instruments. This motive appears 
5  For some additional insights on the topic, see the various contributions to the Fifth Trans-European 
Dialogue in Public Administration (TED5) – many of which are published and/or summarized in Verhoest et 
al. 2012.
OUTCOMES
Convergent
Divergent
Effective formal institutions
Complementary
Accommodating
Ineffective formal institutions
Substitutive
Competing
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only rarely and marginally, if at all, in accounts of Western systems (although, for an 
exception, see the typology in Peters 2001, cited earlier). It is important to add that the 
strength of this informal institution is seen as resulting from the weakness of formal 
institutions of political control (Gajduschek 2012, Meyer-Sahling and Veen 2012). 
Using the categories devised by Helmke and Levitsky (2004), the politicization of civil 
service seems to appear here not so much as a competing (or dysfunctional), but rather 
as a substitutive type of institution. Second, the term politicization is often misleading 
in the CEE context, because the core relationship is based not on a political, but often 
times on a fundamentally personal type of loyalty – the latter being independent from 
or occasionally even running counter to the former. (In an interesting contrast to the 
above, Meyer-Sahling et al. 2012 suggests that CEE civil servants largely reject the 
practice of direct political control and the application of political criteria to manage-
ment, and they prefer performance benchmarks as a basis of judging performance.)
In summary, one may conclude that the increasing politicization of senior civil 
service as an instrument of informal political control has received considerable atten-
tion in recent CEE area studies. However, the causal mechanisms behind the subtle 
purposes served by these informal institutions figured much less (although for some 
attempts, see Hajnal 2012 and 2011). A key ambition of this paper is to contribute to 
a better understanding of the nature, origin and functioning of these institutions.
4. Research questions, the data and the method
4.1 Research questions
As noted earlier, the ambition of this study is twofold. First, we wish to track how 
the formal and informal mechanisms of political control changed under the unique 
conditions that have emerged after 2010 and are characterized by a co-occurring 
fiscal and economic crisis and the emergence of a political superpower in the Hun-
garian political system. Secondly, we examine – and if possible make inferences 
regarding – the nature of informal political control instruments. The broad ambition 
delineated above may be boiled down to two research questions that are – along with 
the associated hypotheses – presented below.
Our first research question is a predominantly descriptive one:
RQ(1): What are the basic patterns and mechanisms of formal political 
 control in Hungary? How did they change (if at all) during the new institu-
tional and constitutional setup of the post-2010 era compared with the pre-
2010 patterns?
There are several – partly theoretical, partly empirically grounded – arguments sup-
porting the expectation that formal control instruments were substantially strength-
ened after 2010.
Firstly, there is – not compelling, but weighty – evidence that the quest for increased 
political control on the part of politicians increases as a result of crisis (Kickert 2012, 
Peters et al. 2011, Peters 2011, and Raudla et al. 2013). Secondly, the doctrinal founda-
tions of the new constitutional framework and the governmental paradigm pursued by 
47
When Crisis Hits Superman: Change and Stability of Political Control and Politicization in Hungary
the post-2010 governing forces – in particular, the “strong state” thesis raised in the 
introductory section – speak for a significant tightening of the “transmission belt” 
between the political power center, on one hand, and policy processes and outcomes, 
on the other. This implies an increasingly “political” mode of governing, as opposed to 
one characterized by significant bureaucratic autonomy and by other societal, technical 
or professional influences. Thirdly, as we saw in the background section, the political 
opposition and institutional checks and balances restricting the extension of formal 
control instruments have been overwhelmingly eliminated since 2010.
Therefore, we may formulate the following hypothesis in relation to RQ(1): 
H(1): In the post-2010 period, a significant extension and strengthening of 
formal instruments of political control is likely to have occurred.
As we argued in the conceptual section, informal institutions of political control 
may emerge, at least in part, because formal institutions are weak. Notably, how-
ever, this weakness – in our view – is not necessarily understood as failing to reach 
institutions’ formal, stated goals. Rather, weakness may imply the lack of goal 
achievement as viewed and understood by the political masters. Therefore the mere 
weakness of formal institutions may imply the emergence of dramatically different 
– most importantly: “substitutive” versus “competing” – types of informal institu-
tions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, see Table 1 above). This distinction boils down to 
the genesis of informal political control mechanisms. Thus, our second question is 
the following:
RQ(2): Do informal institutions of political control in post-transition 
Hungary reinforce underperforming formal institutions; or, rather, do they 
serve different/contrary purposes? I.e., are they of a fundamentally “substi-
tutive” or “competing” nature?
This question is difficult to answer in a direct, straightforward manner. Rather, it is 
the specific context in which the current survey takes place that enables one to make 
inferences regarding the nature of informal political control institutions. Namely, if 
the previous hypothesis H(1) is confirmed – that is, formal control institutions are 
shown to be substantially strengthened – then we can form differing expectations 
with regard to informal institutions, depending on their function and nature. 
One presently dominant stream of recent work implies that politicization is of a 
“substitutive” nature (Gajduschek 2012, Meyer-Sahling and Veen 2012). Substitutive 
institutions, according to this view, exist to supplement weak or non-existent formal 
mechanisms of political control. Therefore, their existence and scope is negatively 
associated with that of formal institutions, and we may formulate another hypoth-
esis as follows:
H(2/Null): The strengthening of formal institutions leads to a decrease in 
politicization and weakens other informal institutions of political control, 
implying that the dominant function of informal control mechanisms is of a 
substitutive nature. 
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However, it may be that politicization and other informal ploys of political control 
serve possibly illegitimate – or even illegal – purposes that are different from, and 
in conflict with, the formal, stated objectives of formal control instruments. This is 
the case, for example, when senior officials’ personal or political loyalty is required 
in order to ensure the illegal channeling of funds/resources to required destinations, 
the sustained operation of networks of favors and counter-favors, or other kinds of 
illegitimate utilization of organizational and political resources. If this is the case, 
indeed, then – contrary to the assumption of the null hypothesis – the strengthening 
of formal instruments cannot be expected to lead to a weakening of informal control 
institutions. This would imply an alternative hypothesis as follows:
H(2/Alternative): Informal institutions of politicization and political control 
do not strengthen as a consequence of strengthened formal institutions, 
implying that they are of a basically competing nature.
4.2 Data and method
Given a general lack of published empirical research into the topic, the empirical basis 
of our answer to RQ(1) is the analysis of selected laws and regulations (and legal mea-
sures amending them) relevant for the problem complex of politicization and political 
control. In addition, we have carried out in-depth interviews with both former and active 
middle-level and senior executives presumably knowledgeable about the surveyed top-
ics. Altogether, seven such interviews were conducted between June 2012 and July 2013. 
The names and institutional affiliations of the interviewees are kept confidential, since 
this was a key precondition of gaining their cooperation. In order to supplement and 
contrast insiders’ views with outsider perspectives, data from another five semi-struc-
tured interviews are used, too. These interviewees involved the leading officials of the 
largest public-sector unions and the directors of the largest public-sector consultancies. 
Altogether five such interviews were conducted during the autumn of 2013. 
Systematic research regarding the patterns of politicization and informal political 
control in the post-2010 years is possibly even scarcer. The analysis, therefore, relies 
on two pillars. First, a substantial portion of the in-depth interviews mentioned above 
were devoted to surveying respondents’ perceptions regarding politicization. Second, 
selected items of a senior civil servant questionnaire were analyzed in order to gain 
a quantitative insight into how politicization changed. The online survey was con-
ducted in June 2012 among medium- and high-level civil servants working in the 
central government apparatus. The response set contains 351 responses, meaning a 
response rate of about 30%. The survey was not based on a sample, but extended to 
the entirety of the target population (senior managers in general government, with a 
larger emphasis on the health and employment sectors).
5. Changes in formal control instruments
The re-shaping of formal institutions of political control occurred in tandem with a 
comprehensive and substantive reform of the structure of Hungarian public admin-
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istration. An indicative rather than exhaustive list of the changes relevant to our 
analytical focus is provided below.
 • The ministerial structure became more centralized (8 instead of 13 minis-
tries). This action served, among others, the stated goal of reducing inter-
ministry conflict and consultation and thereby accelerating governmental 
decision-making. 
 • The regional (middle-tier) branches of central public-administration  agencies 
have been integrated into 20 county-level (so-called) “Government Offices”, 
strictly controlled and directed by the government and headed by political 
appointees (MPs, political state secretaries, etc.; for a detailed description, 
see Hajnal and Kovács 2013). 
 • Local self-governments’ scope of duties and competencies (many important 
functions in the field of operating secondary education and health-care 
facilities) were dramatically reduced by transferring them to the newly 
 created District Government Offices (strictly and hierarchically subordinate 
to County Government Offices). Later on, additional administrative tasks 
and the related bureaucratic capacity of local government offices were taken 
away and transferred to the District Government Offices, too. Elected and 
decentralized county-level self-governments, as a result, lost most of their 
previous – and already quite modest – functions.
 • The new regulation on civil service in the central government (Law LVIII/2010) 
and its subsequent modifications greatly changed the employment conditions 
of civil servants. These changes were so extensive in  relation to labor protec-
tion that employers could, according to the first  version of the new law, dismiss 
civil servants practically without any justification. That is, the extended labor 
protection of civil servants which had characterized the previous twenty years 
of Hungarian civil-service regulations practically ceased. Although this provi-
sion was later invalidated by the Constitutional Court, it remained in effect 
long enough to enable political executives to make profound personnel chang-
es in the civil service to a legally unlimited extent. The subsequent new regula-
tion (Law CXCIX/2011) continues to assess loyalty – a rather vague and very 
broad obligation – as a requirement for employment for every civil servant. 
Lacking this characte ristic constitutes legal grounds for dismissal from civil 
service. In addition, the – legally undefined – condition of a civil servant’s 
“non-conformance with the supervisor’s value standards” became a ground, on 
which (s)he can be dismissed, without further justification.
 • The new civil-service legislation placed the central-state administrative 
apparatus’s recruitment and hiring under strict vertical (administrative and 
political) control. Recruitment is strictly regulated by the core ministry 
(Ministry of Public Administration and Justice). This is considered a right of 
veto, enabling its holder to enforce political considerations over adminis-
trative/technical ones. This vertical coordination measure has been unknown 
in governmental practice up until now (Müller 2011, 135). 
 • Control and surveillance instruments were broadened and strengthened to an 
unprecedented degree (possibly by international standards). For example, 
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active anti-corruption measures (such as approaching officials with fabricat-
ed bribe attempts made by undercover agents) were institutionalized in the 
policy and tax services. Moreover, according to a recent piece of legislation, 
civil servants and their family members can be subject to secret intelligence/
surveillance on a preventive basis – that is, even in the absence of any formal 
accusation or investigation and without permission by the judicial court.
Looking over these changes, we can conclude that a substantive and comprehensive 
transformation of the institutions serving the political control of government 
machinery has taken place. The changes made to the bureaucratic apparatus may be 
expected to lead uniformly to an ever more direct and resistance-free transmission 
of central political will, from the highest echelons down to the “street level” of gov-
ernment bureaucracy. 
6. Changing patterns of politicization
6.1 Key informants’ views 
Seven out of twelve of our interviewees were chosen on account of the fact that they 
are among the few who have served in senior management positions for substantial 
amounts of time both before and after 2010. Therefore, all of them have substantial 
personal, first-hand experience regarding the nature and the extent of changes that 
they have noticed in relation to how political control has worked pre- and post-2010.
As one of our interviewees recalled, after the earlier elections – before 2002 – the 
post-election cleansing campaign mostly affected only higher levels of the hierarchy 
(state secretaries, deputy state secretaries and agency heads); technical levels – the par 
excellence administration – were affected to a much more limited extent. In the 2000s, 
this scope was gradually extended, reaching heads of departments or heads of units 
(one or two levels down the hierarchy chain from deputy state secretaries – 
főosztályvezető, osztályvezető). However, after the 2010 elections, practically “all posi-
tions became political spoil.” This means that the practically full and unconstrained 
possibility for the political executive to fill all ranks in the central government appara-
tuses with politically loyal, “reliable” civil servants – created by the legislation on civil 
service and overviewed in the previous section – was in fact used to a large extent.
Despite this sweeping politicization of personnel, quite interestingly, the funda-
mental lack of mutual trust between politicians and high-level decision makers has 
not decreased since 2010, compared to the pre-2010 levels. Important decisions are 
made on the state-secretary level, with the inclusion of a few political aides only. 
Lower echelons of the administrative apparatus, possessing the necessary systemic 
and technical knowledge, are frequently excluded entirely. Department and section 
heads and their units play a role only in the implementation of decisions already 
taken and elaborated with great detail further up in the hierarchy. Because the insti-
tutionalized possibility and practice of replacing “unreliable” personnel exists, and 
there are further incentives to be/remain loyal, the lack of trust between the top-
level leaders and lower-level professionals in the administration constitutes a phe-
nomenon that requires further research to be explained.
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This modus operandi is not entirely unusual, however, since it was the general prac-
tice before the 2010 elections that decisions on major policy goals and intervention 
areas were usually made outside public administration – by experts, think tanks and 
political aides directly subordinate to the (prime) minister. However, the apparatus 
did play an important role elaborating the details of these decisions. This ensured that 
the substantive and procedural knowledge and information possessed by the appara-
tus were channeled into the decision-making process. This created a sense of owner-
ship over new policies on the part of ministry employees. According to multiple 
accounts, this role in the policy formulation process seems to have overwhelmingly 
disappeared after the post-2010 arrangements stabilized.
6.2 Politicization: Survey findings
Below, we briefly examine our survey data in order to establish findings directly 
related to the here and now of political control and politicization in Hungarian pub-
lic administration. First, we briefly analyze the extent of turnover in the various 
organizations and ranks of central government administration. The Table 2 shows 
the proportion of those who have been working for more than five, versus less than 
five, years in their current organization. Note that the survey was conducted exactly 
two years after the 2010 inauguration of the new government.
Table 2: Proportion of respondents with more versus less than five years of employment 
in their current organization, broken down by organization type and level of hierarchy 
within the organization (n=297)
Ministries
Sub-ministerial level (agencies 
and their territorial branches)
Top hierarchical level in the organization
Second hierarchical level in the organization
Third hierarchical level in the organization
Top hierarchical level in the organization
Second hierarchical level in the organization
Third hierarchical level in the organization
62.5%
54.8%
53.3%
39.3%
34.0%
16.1%
<5 years 5 years 
or more
Total
Tenure in organization
37.5%
45.2%
46.7%
60.7%
66.0%
83.9%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
According to the data, the probability of turnover 
 • increases as one moves from lower to higher positions within the same 
organi zation type and 
 • is higher in ministries than in other organizations. 
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The data indicate that large-scale replacement of personnel is likely to have hap-
pened, especially in the higher echelons of civil service. This finding is in line with 
our interviewees’ perceptions. All of them talk about a very high, possibly unprec-
edented, turnover of personnel enabled by a new civil-service legislation. 
The politicization of civil-service nominations can be examined on the basis of 
perceptual data, too. Survey respondents were asked to express their perceptions 
regarding political influence on appointments. 
Figure 1: Politicians regularly influence senior management appointments in my orga-
nization. (1 – strongly disagree, 7 – strongly agree; n=228)
The two-way ANOVA performed on the data showed significant main effects 
(p<0.01; the interaction effect is not significant), meaning that the effects depicted 
on the Figure 1 are statistically significant. This signifies two things:
 • The lower one goes in the management hierarchy, the stronger respondents 
perceive the political influence coming from above. This reinforces our ear-
lier qualitative finding that rank and file public managers feel overwhelmed 
by uncontrollable political intrusions. Moreover, it sharply contradicts the 
traditional, “top-down” conceptualization of politicization, whereby it is 
predominantly thought to characterize the top echelons of administration.
 • From an inter-organizational perspective, it is an interesting and (in the view 
of other analyses not detailed here) robust pattern that politicization is high 
in ministerial and territorial (de-concentrated) organizations (reaching mean 
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values above the 4.5 mid-point), whereas significantly lower in central-
government agencies. The difference between ministries and central agen-
cies is not surprising, since it reinforces the picture of a highly politicized 
policy formulation (in the ministries) and a relatively more technical imple-
mentation process (in central agencies). Interpreting the high politicization 
found in relation to territorial agencies would, however, require substantial 
additional analysis not feasible here.
A note of caution on the interpretation of survey-analysis results and their validity is 
in order at this point. The Hungarian civil service is traditionally very cautious and 
defensive in relation to any outside attempt to reveal perceptions, opinions or even 
simple facts. This claim is difficult to support with compelling arguments besides the 
experience of one of the authors, who has, over the past one and a half decades, con-
ducted several nationwide and several other more focused questionnaire surveys and 
numerous qualitative surveys among Hungarian civil servants. In view of the chang-
es described on the previous pages, this secrecy and lack of trust has significantly 
worsened, understandably, since 2010. Civil servants, especially in higher ranks, 
often seem to behave in ways which strike the outsider as paranoid (although closer 
familiarity with facts and urban legends makes one more sympathetic to these atti-
tudes). Consequently, a general caution has to be exerted, more so than in “normal” 
cases. Responses are likely to be considerably more optimistic than true perceptions. 
7. Conclusions
As regards RQ(1), the analyses of formal legal institutional changes, as well as key 
informants’ perceptions and views, clearly confirm that formal institutions changed 
dramatically after the 2010 elections. The changes consistently point towards 
increasing levels of both formal political control and (partly formal, partly informal) 
politicization in the sense of increasing politicians’ influence over administrative 
appointments and other HRM decisions across all levels of the hierarchy. There is 
also evidence that much of the powers instituted by the new legislation were indeed 
used. (Note, however, that “using” an instrument may mean different things. For 
example, the even formally unlimited possibility to fire civil servants – which 
existed, in its purest form, from the summer of 2010 until it was annulled by the 
Constitutional Court in May 2011 – was, in fact, widely used. The legal instrument 
substituting the annulled one – removal on the basis of “loss of confidence” and 
“non-conformance with the supervisor’s value standards” – was, presumably, used 
infrequently. However, this measure may well function even without being actually 
used. The possibility of applying the provision already ensures a large extent of 
political control and enforced loyalty).
The mere fact that formal, de jure instruments of political control, in addition to 
their de facto application, have substantially strengthened after 2010 does not, in and 
by itself, imply that this is a consequence of the financial crisis having occurred 
beforehand. Rather, it is the contrary. Actually, what we can see already in Hungary’s 
pre-2010 history is a pattern of repeated attempts to strengthen political control and 
politicization. Therefore, it is possible that a decisive electoral majority – such as the 
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one that emerged in 2010 – would have instituted such changes even in the absence 
of a fiscal crisis. Thus, we may only claim that our findings are congruent with the 
expectations underlying Hypothesis (1); that is, one or both of the driving forces 
mentioned there – the crisis and the “strong state” doctrine – may have played a role.
Turning to RQ(2), we analyzed whether informal institutions of political control 
act towards reinforcing underperforming formal institutions or rather serve purposes 
different from (or possibly even running counter to) formal institutional purposes. In 
other words, using the terminology developed by Helmke and Levitsky (2004), do 
they manifest informal political control of a fundamentally “substitutive” or “com-
peting” type? We considered whether the strengthening of formal institutions leads 
to a decrease in the strength and proliferation of politicization and other informal 
institutions of political control; or, on the contrary, whether informal institutions of 
politicization and political control do not grow stronger as a consequence of 
strengthened formal institutions. Answering yes to the first question would imply 
that institutions of informal political control are of a substitutive nature, whereas the 
“alternative” answer implies the presence of competing informal institutions. 
Our various pieces of evidence are clear-cut in this regard. Informal political 
control has not weakened, but rather substantially strengthened, even after the new 
and greatly extended control instruments were institutionalized. Consequently, infor-
mal political control and politicization as it exists in Hungary can be thought of as a 
set of institutions subverting, rather than reinforcing, the purposes and operation of 
formal institutions of control.
In our view, this is the most significant finding of this study. It is indeed some-
what confusing that politicians first create – albeit without legislative difficulties, but 
still with substantial political (and other) costs involving conflicts with European 
bodies and the ECJ – an institutional framework that enables them to hire, fire and 
promote anybody in the governmental apparatus at will – a situation which all previ-
ous governments could have only dreamt of. Then, using the opportunities thus cre-
ated, they indeed remove much of the personnel, deep down into the hierarchy, and 
replace them with personnel carefully selected (or at least, well approved) by politi-
cal actors. Moreover, they create unprecedented and extremely harsh instruments for 
the surveillance and monitoring of those who remain employed. Ultimately, though, 
they have an extent of confidence in these officials which is far below the (already 
modest) level manifested by previous administrations.
As intriguing as this puzzle is, however, its solution is unfortunately beyond the 
scope and capacity of this study. At this point, there is only one “proto-explanation” 
we are able to devise, rooted in scattered and anecdotal evidence and admittedly 
hypothetical. Namely, it may be that political masters’ lack of confidence in their 
apparatuses stems not from the classical principle-agent problem, whereby principals 
strive to minimize agents’ incentives to deviate from the observance of official, 
previously-stated goals, acting according to ideas of their own or of some other 
stakeholders. Rather, this peculiar pattern may be explained by political principals’ 
“double” goal system: besides and/or, possibly, instead of the achievement of for-
mally stated goals, they expect their agents to follow an “informal agenda,” obey 
illegitimate expectations of their political masters and participate actively in informal 
networks of “favors” and “counter-favors.” Of course, the lack of compliance with 
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such expectations is difficult to sanction through official, institutionalized channels. 
It is this insufficiency – or, in Helmke and Levitsky’s (2004) words, “weakness” – of 
formal institutions that triggers the dense network of informal control instruments.
Whether and to what extent this hypothetical explanation is valid, and what its 
temporal, geographical and organizational scope is, is subject to further inquiry.
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